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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent7
-vs-

.

Case No.
14446

THERON JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault,
a violation of Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1975), Section
76-5-103.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury by the
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen on the 5th day of January,
1976, and was found guilty of aggravated assault as
charged.

Appellant was sentenced, after a 90 day

diagnostic and pre-sentence reporting period, on April
16, 197 6 to serve less than five years in the Utah
State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance the conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Jerry Cronin, a BYU student began working
part-time, as a process server on the first of December,
1975 (T-10).

The next day, December 2, 1975, he went

to appellant's home to serve a legal paper.
not home.

Appellant was

Mr. Cronin spoke with appellant's wife very

briefly and asked when appellant might be home, then he
left (T-13).

Two days later on December 4, 1975, Mr.

Cronin again went to appellant's home. Mr. Cronin
knocked on the door.

According to Mr. Cronin, the door

immediately opened and appellant was standing in the
door pointing a rifle directly at Mr. Cronin (T-16).
Mr. Cronin immediately threw his hands up and said,
"Forget it, sir, I am getting out of here,"

(T-21).

Mr. Cronin then started down the driveway with appellant
chasing him.

Appellant reversed his hold on the gun

(thereby holding the barrel instead of the stock) and
swung it at Mr. Cronin, but Mr. Cronin ducked

(T-21,22).

Mr. Cronin then got in his car and drove away.
POINT I
THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The information in the present case charged
appellant as follows:
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". . . on or about the 4th day of
December, 1975,• . . [appellant]
threatened, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to Jerry Cronin by use
of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.11
(Record on Appeal, p. 47)
This language is directly from Utah Code Ann.
§§76-5-103, and 76-5-102 (Supp. 1975).

Appellant

contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution
was insufficient to support a conviction for the crime
of aggravated assault.

Respondent submits that an

examination of the evidence shows every element of the
crime of aggravated assault was conclusively established.
Before re-examining the evidence, it is
important to point out that a jury verdict must stand
unless it appears that the evidence was so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds must have
entered reasonable doubts that the crime was committed.
State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (I960),
reaffirmed in State v. Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 499
P.2d 269 (1972).

In other words, the strong presumption

is that a jury verdict is correct.

Appellant, to prevail,

has the burden to prove that the jury verdict was unreasonable and this he has failed to do.
Furthermore, when evidence is viewed on appeal,
it is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

State v> Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959)
reaffirmed in State v. Georgeopoulos, 27 Utah 2d
53, 492 P.2d 1353 (1972).

As the Utah Supreme Court

has said:
" . . . the correct pattern of
procedure on appeal. . . is. . .
to respect the prerogative of
the jury as the exclusive judges
of the credibility of the facts.
Consequently, we assume that they
believed the State's evidence, and
we survey [the evidence] together with
all fair inferences that the jury
could reasonably draw therefrom,
in the light most favorable to
their verdict." State v. Canfield,
18 Utah 2d 292, 294, 422 P.2d 196
(1967).
In order to obtain a conviction, it was necessary
for the state to prove that appellant:

(1) threatened

to do bodily injury to another; (2) accompanied that
threat by a show of force or violence; (3) used a
deadly weapon; and (4) had no lawful justification
for the threat.

It is undisputed by appellant that

he met Mr. Cronin at the door with his rifle and
that he chased him off his property with the rifle
(T-92,93).

Therefore, the only remaining questions

are whether the rifle was a deadly weapon (appellant
claims that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon),
and whether appellant had a lawful right to do what
he did.

Respondent submits that appellant's rifle
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was a deadly weapon and that appellant had no lawful
right to act as he did.
A.

A RIFLE IS A DEADLY WEAPON WHETHER LOADED

OR NOT.
The Utah Supreme Court held, in State v. Nielson,
544, P.2d 489 (Utah - 1965) that a rifle or gun is a
deadly weapon under the meaning of the statutes whether
it is loaded or not.

Therefore, the state has proved

the element of use of a deadly weapon.

No proof is

needed as to whether or not a bullet was in the rifle.
Furthermore, even if the rifle was unloaded it would
still be a deadly weapon.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(a)

(Supp. 1975), defines a deadly weapon as:
"Anything that in the manner of
its use or intended use is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury."
There is no doubt but that a rifle could be deadly if
used as a club.

Many states that hold that a gun must

be loaded to be deadly have an exception to that rule
for guns which could also be used as a club.

See

Hutton v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965),
People v. Hood, 160 Cal. App.. 2d 121, 324 P.2d 656
(1958).
In other words, a gun (pistol or rifle) is a
deadly weapon whether it is loaded or not if it could

-5-
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effectively be used as a club.

In both of the cases

cited, supra, from California and Colorado, a defendant
was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon even
though the weapon was a toy pistol since it could
still be used as a club.
Finally, it is important to note that appellant
in this case, did use the rifle as a club.

Mr. Cronin

testified, as did Mrs. Cronin, that appellant, while
chasing Mr. Cronin down the driveway, reversed his
hold on the rifle and holding it by the barrel, took
a swing at Mr. Croninfs head with it (T-22,40).
Respondent submits that there is no doubt but that the
rifle, used by appellant, was a deadly weapon within
the meaning of the statute.
B.

APPELLANT HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO DO WHAT

HE DID.
Appellant argues that he is innocent of the
crime of aggravated assault since, he claims, he has
a legal right to defend his property and possessions.
Appellant also claims innocence because he believed
that Mr. Cronin might harm his family or property.
In Utah the applicable statutes are Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-2-405 and 76-2-406 (Supp. 1975).

Section

7 6-2-4 06 justifies the use of force by one man against
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another if the first man reasonably believes that the
second is criminally interfering with the first man's
real property.

That section, however, is completely

inapplicable to the present case since it only
justifies the use of "force, other than deadly force."
In the instant case, appellant used deadly force
and so can not claim justification through the statute.
Additionally, appellant had absolutely no reason to
believe Mr. Cronin was interfering with his property.
Section 76-2-405 justifies the use of force,
including deadly force by one man against another
if the first man reasonably believes that the other
is making or attempting to make an unlawful entry
or attack upon the first man's house.

However, this

section is also unavailable to appellant as justification
for his actions.

The deadly force may not be used

unless the other man attempted to enter the home in
a "violent and tumiltuous manner."

There is absolutely

no evidence at all that Mr. Cronin attempted to
enter appellant's home in a violent or tumiltuous
manner or that he attempted to do any harm to appellant's
property or family.

Mr. Cronin was there to serve

a legal paper on appellant.

Since appellant had

no justification for what he did, his conviction should
be affirmed.
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Appellant made two other arguments which
can be answered briefly.

He claims that assault

is an attempt to do injury to another and that he
did not "attempt" but only "threatened."

This

argument shows complete ignorance of the statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (b) (Supp. 1975), plainly
states that:
"Assault is a threat. . • to do
bodily injury to another." (Emphasis
added)
Appellant also cites a 1845 North Carolina case for
the proposition that the law makes allowances for
the angry passions and infirmities of man.

Respondent

submits that in 197 6 the law in Utah is not the same
as it may have been in North Carolina in 1845.
There is no excuse, under the Utah Code, for a man
to point a rifle at another and then swing it at
the other man's head, simply because he does not
want to be served a legal paper.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that, all elements of the
crime being proved, and no justification existing for
appellant's conduct, appellant's conviction should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant
Attorney
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